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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Excessive government intervention was one of the principal causes of the 
1997 financial crisis of South Korea (Korea hereafter).  Therefore, drastic 
reforms were undertaken in response to the crisis not only in the private 
sector (finance, business and labour) but also in the public sector.  In 1998, 
President Kim Dae-jung initiated a variety of public sector reforms with the 
objective of “a small and efficient but better serving government” (P. S. Kim, 
2000).  This aimed at creating a competitive, efficient and highly productive 
government based on market-, performance-, and customer-oriented 
principles.  Nonetheless, the Korean public sector is still regarded as bloated, 
concentrated, inflexible and inefficient.  A number of attempts have been 
made to examine and evaluate public sector reforms (P. S. Kim, 2000; Yang, 
2004; Jeong et al., 2005).  Yet, the criteria for evaluating these reforms are 
not appropriately established, and the mechanism and processes through 
which public sector reforms affect the economy in particular are not 
adequately articulated.  After all, the fundamental objective underlying the 
entire reforms post-1997 crisis, including the public sector reforms, was to 
streamline the operation of the economy to avoid future economic crises. 
This paper examines and evaluates public sector reforms undertaken in 
Korea since the 1997 financial crisis with a focus on the Kim Dae-jung and 
Roh Moo-hyun governments.  Two overarching issues of the public sector 
are whether public policies are consistent with citizen preferences, and 
whether public services are provided efficiently.  The first question is 
concerned, in essence, with the political process of policy-making which is 
beyond of the scope of this paper.  The latter concerns the management of 
public administration for the efficient and effective performance of public 
functions.  The scope of management of public administration involves the 
organisational structure and the operational process.  The organisational 
structure includes organisational goals and strategy, formal government 
structure, and assignments of actions with administrative tools.  The 
operational process includes interaction among stakeholders, problem solving 
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resolutions, and enforcement of the resolutions.  
In analysing and assessing the management system of public 
administration in Korea, this paper focuses on public governance, which 
refers to the formal and informal arrangements that determine relationships 
among stakeholders and how public decisions are made and implemented 
(Mimicopoulos, 2007; Kaufmann et al., 2012).  Based on the concept of 
public governance, Korea’s public management reforms are assessed.  This is 
then augmented by a comparative evaluation of Korea’s public sector 
management by comparing it with the counterparts of advanced countries.  
 
 
2. EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR PUBLIC SECTOR  
MANAGEMENT REFORMS 
 
The criterion chosen to assess the Korean public sector management 
reforms is the concept of “good public governance” which means the needs 
of the public being served effectively, efficiently and fairly.  Good public 
governance is achieved via appropriate public decisions and actions 
implemented through suitable structures and processes for all aspects of 
executive management.  As pointed out by a number of empirical studies 
(Mimicopoulos, 2007), good public governance helps strengthen democracy, 
and promotes economic prosperity and social cohesion.  The framework for 
good public governance for this study is focused on economic perspectives.  
Consistent with Korea’s strategic economic goal of achieving the status of 
an advanced market-oriented, knowledge-based economy, the following 
inter-related dimensions of good public governance are selected as evaluation 
criteria: (a) effectiveness, (b) efficiency, (c) predictability, (d) transparency, 
and (e) participation.
1)
  Effectiveness refers to the extent of the achievement 
                                                 
1) Various organisations have come up with different sets of dimensions for good public 
governance which comprise basic principles of human rights protection, democracy, 
transparency, participation, decentralised power sharing, sound public administration, 
accountability, rule of law, effectiveness, equity, strategic vision and so on.  For the basic 
characteristics of these measurements, see Mimicopoulos (2007) who proposes three 
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of the overall strategic economic goals.  Effectiveness implies consistency, 
which in turn requires public management in line with the overall strategic 
economic goals and their consistent pursuit over time or over political 
regimes.  Without effectiveness and consistency in public management, it is 
difficult for the private sector to make its economic and business decisions.  
Effectiveness also implies appropriate coordination of reforms undertaken by 
a variety of government ministries and agencies. Effectiveness of public 
governance in Korea may be measured by the quality of public services, 
competence of civil servants, and independence of civil servants from 
politicians. Quality of regulations would also be a measuring rod for public 
sector effectiveness, as they directly affect economic activities of the private 
sector.    
Efficiency in the implementation of public administration should be one of 
the requisites in that the same output should be obtained with a reduction of 
inputs.  Otherwise, nation’s resource allocation is regarded as inefficient. 
Efficiency is a relative term, the ratio of output to input.  Given the difficulty 
in measuring the output of the public sector, the ratio of the productivity 
index of the public sector to the input index would measure the efficiency 
with which public management operates.  In Korea, however, public sector 
productivity is not readily available.  Efficiency may thus be measured by 
input of the public sector, which is in turn measured by the extent of public 
expenditure relative to GDP, the number of civil servants compared to 
overall employment, and wages rates for civil servants compared to 
employees in the private sector.  
Predictability in the management of the public sector is the most important 
criterion for private businesses (Mimicopoulos, 2007).  Unpredictability 
increases risk in the business environment and produces disincentives for 
investment.  Predictability and consistency reinforce each other.  Without an 
adequate level of consistency in public management, it is difficulty to 
maintain predictability.  Predictability may be measured in part by political 
                                                                                                                   
criteria: efficiency, transparency and participation.  Kaufmann et al. (2008) proposes six 
dimensions as shown in table 3.  For Korea’s strategic economic goal, see Kwon (2010). 
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stability and the volatility of budgetary expenditures.   
Transparency is increasingly considered as one of the basic operating 
requirements for any government.  Transparency requires unobstructed flows 
of information between the government and the public.  The public should 
also be informed of assumptions and estimates of benefits and costs of public 
programs when the government introduces them.  Government should also be 
accountable for its actions and procedures.  Accountability goes hand in hand 
with transparency.  Transparency and accountability improve the credibility 
of government actions, enhance the rule of law, and minimise corruption.  
Transparency may thus be measured by the extent of the public’s compliance 
with rules and laws and by the level of corruption. 
Success of public management depends on how comprehensively the 
government incorporates the aggregate social interest or the “encompassing 
interest” (McGuire and Olson, 1996).  Government stakeholders are a diverse 
mix of citizens, businesses and special interest groups, often with widely 
divergent values and objectives.  It is up to the government to drive these 
conflicting viewpoints down to a single set of strategic administrative 
procedures that best serve the public interest and achieve the strategic goals.  
This involves participation of stakeholders in decision-making and 
implementation of public administrative measures.  Increased participation 
can be achieved by strengthening the freedom and pluralism of the media, 
and establishing consultative councils to facilitate the transmission of 
information between the public and private sectors. Participation may be 
measured by the extent of involvement of consultative councils in public 
management, the extent of the use of e-government, or the number of NGOs.  
E-government is an important tool with which to improve not only 
administrative effectiveness and efficiency but also citizens’ participation in 
governance.  Against these five criteria, Korea’s public sector reforms since 
1997 are examined and assessed with a focus on the Kim and Roh 
governments over the period from 1998 to 2007. 
Kaufmann et al. (2008) produce the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGIs) that measure perceptions of the quality of cross-country governance, 
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synthesizing the views and reports on the quality of governance from a large 
number of enterprises, citizens and experts as well as well-known worldwide 
survey organizations such as the World Economic Forum (WEF), the 
International Institute for Management Development (IMD), the World Bank 
Business Environment Surveys, and the Gallop World Poll.  To mitigate the 
challenges of aggregating numerous cross-country indicators, Kaufmann et al. 
(2008) identify six inter-related fundamental dimensions of public 
governance:  
 
(1) voice and accountability: the quality of citizens’ participation in 
politics and freedom of expression, association and media; 
(2) political stability and absence of violence: the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including terrorism; 
(3) government effectiveness: the quality of public services and 
bureaucracy, competence of civil servants, independence of civil 
service from politicians;  
(4) regulatory quality: the quality of policy and regulations to permit and 
promote private sector development; 
(5) rule of law: perception of the likelihood of crime and violence, 
society’s compliance with rules, the enforcement quality of laws and 
contracts by the judiciary; and  
(6) control of corruption: the level of corruption by exercises of public 
power for private gain.  
 
The measured score of each indicator ranges between –2.5 to 2.5 with a 
mean of zero, with higher scores corresponding to better governance.  The 
percentile rank ranges from zero to 100, with higher ones corresponding to 
better rankings, out of 212 countries and territories surveyed. 
The above six dimensions by Kaufmann et al. (2008) are quite consistent 
with the five evaluation criteria of this paper.  Voice and accountability 
reflects participation of the stakeholders in decision makings and 
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implementation of public administration.  Political stability and absence of 
violence imply consistency and predictability in public governance.  
Government effectiveness seems equivalent to governance effectiveness, 
although their measurement methods may be different.  High regulatory 
quality improves effectiveness of public governance particularly in terms of 
state-business relationship and private sector development. Rule of law and 
control of corruption reflect transparency.  Also control of corruption 
improves business environment, enhancing both effectiveness and efficiency 
of public governance.  Hence, the scores of individual WGIs for Korea will 
be employed in assessing Korea’s public governance in terms of the five 
criteria.  Since the WGIs provide the scores and percentile rankings of 
individual conditions for good public governance across countries, they will 
be used in assessing Korea’s public sector management reforms in a global 
comparative context.  The following section provides a brief descriptive 
overview of the major reforms undertaken in the area of public management 
since 1997.     
 
 
3. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 
 
3.1. Government Structural Reforms 
 
Korea was engulfed by a financial crisis just weeks before the presidential 
election in December 1997.  The cumbersome size of government ministries 
and their inefficient organisations were held to be part of the major reasons 
why the government did not foresee and deflect the crisis (Yang, 2004).  It 
quickly became obvious to the new President that widespread government 
restructuring should take place beyond what would normally occur under a 
new political administration.  In addition, the IMF rescue conditions required 
drastic fiscal austerity measures, implying the reduction of some ministries 
and agencies.  The election of Kim Dae-jung marked a watershed as the first 
peaceful transfer of power in Korean politics from the ruling conservative 
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government to a liberal-democratic opposition party.  It was thus expected 
that the new government would undertake drastic reforms of the public sector 
not only to meet the IMF rescue conditions but also to change the 
bureaucratic culture. Shortly prior to the inauguration of the Kim 
Administration in February 1998, the National Assembly passed the 
Administrative Procedure Act that provided the legal foundation for public 
sector reforms (APEC, 2007).  
The first restructuring of the public sector commenced immediately after 
the new government took office in February 1998 with the stated objectives 
of the rationalisation of state functions by creating a smaller, more efficient 
government; the enhancement of efficiency by incorporating competition into 
public sector functions and among civil service personnel; and cultural 
change toward a more customer-oriented public service (Choi, 1999; Jeong et 
al., 2005; Yong and Tan, 2005).  
A variety of structural reorganisations were undertaken under the Kim 
Dae-jung government.  Noticeable among them were the establishment of the 
Office of Budget and the Planning and Budget Committee under direct 
presidential authority, with a commensurate reduction of functions of the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE). Primary responsibility for 
international trade negotiations was transferred from the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which became the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT).  To remedy the lack of prudential 
supervision of the financial sector, supervisory roles were withdrawn from 
the Bank of Korea and MOFE and transferred to a new Financial Supervisory 
Commission (FSC) under prime ministerial authority.  The Financial 
Supervisory Service (FSS) was established under the FSC as the operational 
organisation to implement financial monitoring.  In 2006, it employed 1686 
officials (Lee and Park, 2009).  To enhance policy coordination and 
evaluation, and to eliminate redundant functions, the former Administrative 
Coordination Office was upgraded to the Office of the Prime Minister (Jeong 
et al., 2005).  
The second restructuring of May 1999 was on operational systems, while 
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the first restructuring of 1998 had focused more on structural change.  
Despite the relatively large changes in the 1998 reforms, public opinion held 
that the government had protected itself from the dramatic restructuring in 
the private sector, and that the pain was not being shared equally across 
society.  Hence, the second restructuring sought to directly address public 
concerns and adopted a more robust approach to rationalisation of the public 
sector by pressing for reductions in the workforce and transferring some 
service delivery responsibility to the private sector and local government 
(Yang, 2004; Jeong et al., 2005). 
A third restructuring, which took place in January 2001, was intended to 
reinforce certain social and economic policies for policy coordination and in 
response to emerging new public demands.  The position of Minister for 
Economic Affairs was upgraded to Deputy Prime Minister in response to 
criticisms that the lack of a central figure coordinating economic policy was 
making reform more difficult.  The Minister of Education and Human 
Resources was upgraded to Deputy Prime Minister in charge of human 
resource management, due to the emergence of sensitive post-crisis issues 
such as re-education of displaced workers and development of human capital.  
The establishment of the Ministry of Gender Affairs was the final major 
development in the third government restructuring (Yang, 2004; Jeong et al., 
2005).
2)
   
 
3.2. Government Managerial Reforms 
 
Government managerial reforms were undertaken alongside structural 
reforms to enhance public sector effectiveness and efficiency (Lim and 
Hwang, 2002; Jeong et al., 2005).  The newly established Office of Budget 
introduced the “total operational expense system,” whereby the Office set a 
budgetary ceiling, under which each ministry and agency would determine 
the priority and amount of specific expenditures (Choi, 1999).  This provided 
                                                 
2) For other structural reorganisations undertaken by the Kim Dae-jung government, see Yang 
(2004) and Jeong et al. (2005).  
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ministries and government agencies with greater flexibility and discretion in 
expenditure decisions.  It was also intended to promote efficiency in the 
budget process by conditionally offering public servants a portion of any 
savings that they helped to create.  Budget funds were also allocated to 
ministries and agencies in accordance with their achievements in 
implementing managerial reforms (Chang and Chae, 2004).  Another 
important reform to the budgetary process was the establishment of a budget 
advisory board to solicit expert advice from a wide spectrum of public and 
business specialists (Choi, 1999).  
As mentioned above, the government sought to reduce the workforce as 
part of its second reform.  Each ministry was given one year to lay off a 
certain number of employees, and was prohibited from all recruitment and 
promotion during that time.  Subsequently, the government capped its 
workforce numbers permanently, although some priority occupations such as 
teachers were excluded (Jeong et al., 2005).  The number of government 
employees was reduced significantly during the post-crisis era.  As shown in 
table 1, the total number of civil servants at the end of 1997 was estimated to 
be 934,000 (including central, provincial and local governments).  This had 
been reduced to 868,000 by the end of 2001.  
To further improve efficiency in government service delivery, codes of 
conduct, performance guidelines, incentive schemes, and merit-based 
personnel management were introduced.  A new Civil Service Commission 
(CSC) was established in 1999 to promote transparency, merit and neutrality 
in civil service personnel appointments (P. S. Kim, 2000; Yang, 2004; Jeong 
et al., 2005).  After 1997, the government allowed the hiring of civilians for 
the top three civil service grades, thereby bypassing the high civil service 
examinations.  Government pay scales were adjusted more in line with the 
private sector, and various pay incentives were introduced.  The civil service 
has moved away from seniority-based salaries, toward a system where 
remuneration was differentiated within each pay grade relative to 
performance.  
To improve the accountability and performance of civil servants, nearly 600 
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Table 1 Number of Civil Servants and Government Expenditure 
Year 
Number of Civil Servant Public Expenditure 
No of 
Civil 
Servants 
(‘000) 
Growth 
Rate 
(%) 
Percent of 
Population 
(%) 
Percent of 
Employed 
(%) 
Expenditure 
(trill. won) 
Growth 
Rate 
(%) 
Percent 
of GDP 
(%) 
1992 886 - 1.99 4.66 45.5 9.5 18.5 
1993 900 1.54 2.00 4.69 50.7 11.6 18.7 
1994 908 0.86 2.00 4.59 60.4 19.0 18.7 
1995 905 –0.24 1.97 4.44 71.6 18.6 19.0 
1996 926 2.25 2.00 4.43 84.4 18.0 20.2 
1997 934 0.91 2.00 4.41 100.3 18.8 22.1 
1998 887 –5.10 1.89 4.46 115.4 15.1 26.0 
1999 878 –1.00 1.85 4.33 121.0 4.8 25.1 
2000 872 –0.64 1.83 4.11 129.3 6.9 24.8 
2001 868 –0.46 1.81 4.02 136.8 5.8 25.1 
2002 890 2.52 1.85 4.01 136.0 –0.5 19.9 
2003 916 2.92 1.89 4.14 164.3 20.8 22.7 
2004 936 2.23 1.93 4.14 173.5 5.6 22.3 
2005 931 –0.57 1.91 4.07 187.9 8.3 23.2 
2006 957 2.81 1.95 4.13 205.9 9.6 24.3 
2007 975 1.88 2.01 4.17 209.8 1.9 23.3 
2008 975 0.00 2.00 4.13 238.8 13.8 23.3 
2009 971 –0.40 2.00 4.13 272.9 14.3 25.7 
Sources: KNSO (2003-2010a). 
 
Public Service Charters were published by nearly 300 agencies from central 
and local governments, presenting performance targets and standards (Jeong 
et al., 2005).  To prevent corruption, the Presidential Advisory Council for 
Anti-Corruption was established in 1999, and the Anti-Corruption Act was 
enacted in 2001.  Under this Act, the Korean Independent Commission 
against Corruption (KICAC) was established in 2002 (Kwon, 2008).  The 
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Commission has set the direction for anti-corruption policy, establishing the 
Public Service Ethics Act and the Code of Conduct for Public Officials, and 
providing protection for whistle-blowers.  The KICAC was the first official 
body in Korean history solely dedicated to anticorruption activities.  In 2008, 
it was integrated into the new Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission 
(ACRC) along with the Office of Ombudsman and Administrative Appeals 
Commission (Choi, 2009).   
To improve transparency, a new Government Information Disclosure Act 
was introduced which provided the public with the right to request any 
government documents, except those related to national security.  In 2001, 
Korea passed the first comprehensive legislation on e-government, the 
“Promotion of Digitalisation of Administrative Work for E-Government 
Realisation Act”.  Under the Act, public institutions had to create their own 
information management systems, through which information could be 
properly kept and speedily searched by making full use of information 
technologies (Jeong et al., 2005).  The government also initiated e-
government with the “Comprehensive Plan for e-Government” announced in 
1999.  E-government is expected to use the Internet as a “one-stop 
processing” point for routine administrative procedures and applications, 
public provision of information, public feedback, government procurement, 
and liaison between central, regional and local governments (Yang, 2004; 
Jeong et al., 2005; Yong and Tan, 2005).  By 2002, the Korean government 
launched the government e-service website which offered access to almost 
400 public services (Yong and Tan, 2005).  
Serious efforts were made by the Kim government to enhance public 
participation in government affairs.  The Administrative Procedure Act of 
1998 was designed to ensure the participation of citizens and civic 
organisations in the policy-making process through preliminary 
announcements on legislation, government policies and public hearings 
(APEC, 2007).  Citizens’ participation was also promoted with the 
introduction of the above-mentioned online system, through which citizens 
and the government could exchange information and ideas.  Management 
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consulting was introduced in mid-1998 in all central government departments. 
Eight firms, including foreign companies, were selected through open tenders 
(P. S. Kim, 2000).  Finally, as part of its managerial reforms, the government 
attempted to change the culture of bureaucracy toward more customer-
oriented public services.  This was an attempt to cultivate the idea that the 
government is a service provider that must serve the public, rather than the 
traditional idea of top-down government.   
The Roh Moo-hyun government, inaugurated in February 2003, did not 
have the same mandate for public sector reforms as its predecessor.  Thus, 
Roh did not undertake structural reforms beyond what would normally occur 
under a new political administration.  Instead, the Roh government 
introduced continuous reforms in public administration and personnel 
management to foster effective government, though not necessarily smaller 
or more efficient.  The Roh government identified five goals — efficiency, 
customer satisfaction, transparency, decentralisation and participation — as 
key elements of its administration (APEC, 2007).  This was to fulfil Roh’s 
political pledges of an “effective and serving government,” “a participatory 
government,” and “regionally balanced development” (K. B. Kim, 2007).  To 
this end, the Roh government pursued continuous reforms over its five year 
tenure and attempted to establish a “reform culture” by coordinating, 
consolidating and networking reform processes across individual ministries. 
It also introduced the concept of the team and the business management 
system into public sector management (S. B. Kim, 2007). 
The Roh government certainly attempted to achieve administrative 
transparency, efficiency and participation in part by improving on the 
outstanding result of the e-government from the Kim government.  In this 
regard, the Roh government announced the “Participatory Government’s 
Vision and Direction of E-Government” in 2003 with the aim of realising the 
“World Best Open E-Government,” and set up a set of specific objectives, 
strategies and action plans over his presidential tenure 2003-2008 (Obi, 
2004).  Some specific objectives include increasing online work processing 
from 15% in 2003 to 85% in 2008, reducing visits for civil service applicants 
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from 10 to 3 visits per year, and raising the utilisation rate of e-government 
from 23% to 60% over the same period.  To realise the goals of the 
“Participatory e-Government” plans, a Presidential Committee on 
Government Innovation and Decentralisation was established as an advisory 
body to the office of the President.  Also the Government Superhighway 
Network was established connecting all departments and government 
agencies (Yong and Tan, 2005). 
 “Participatory government” aimed at social cohesion and voluntary 
cooperation with the state by fostering civil society organisations and 
establishing a large number of commissions and committees under the 
president, ministers and agencies.  In 2005, there were 381 committees with 
3100 committee members under the central government, and 1391 
committees with 3292 members under provincial governments (Hwang, 
2007).  The budget for these committees increased from 54 billion won in 
2002 to 237 billion won in 2007 (Lee and Park, 2009).  In undertaking 
incessant reforms, the number of civil servants increased from 890,000 in 
2002 to 936,000 in 2004 and further to 975,000 in 2007.  This number 
remained about the same in 2009 under the new Lee Myung-bak government 
(table 1).  In addition, the Roh government initiated the dispersal of central 
government ministries to regions as part of its regionally balanced 
development plan.  
 
 
4. EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENT STRUCTURAL  
AND MANAGERIAL REFORMS 
 
Certainly a variety of public sector reforms were undertaken by the Kim 
and Roh governments, whereby new structural organisations and new rules 
and measures were introduced to improve public governance including 
effectiveness, efficiency, predictability, transparency and participation.  A 
number of Korea observers have argued that reforms introduced by the Kim 
and Roh governments have contributed to the effectiveness of governance.  
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The Kim government attempted to improve governance effectiveness by 
enhanced policy coordination, and targeting budgetary allocations toward 
emerging new public needs.  Moon and Ju (2007) find that expenditure areas 
of emerging social demands, such as education, infrastructure and income 
distribution, increased relatively faster than other areas.  Because of the 
similarity in ideology under the Kim and Roh administrations, relative 
consistency was maintained by carrying out reforms in the same direction, 
contributing to overall governance effectiveness.  S. B. Kim (2007) argues 
that the business management system and the team concept introduced by the 
Roh government helped improve governance effectiveness.  It has been 
pointed out that the e-government development strategy by the Roh 
government has yielded significant fruits, as attested by the UN Global E-
Government Survey in which Korea ranked first in both the e-government 
development index and e-participation index in 2010 (UN, 2010). 
Contrary to those positive assessments as above, some scholars are quite 
critical of the public sector reforms undertaken by the Kim and Roh 
governments, probably because of different perspectives these commentators 
have focused.  Yang (2004) argues that by the time of the third reform by the 
Kim government in 2001, political expediencies appeared to have won out 
over the initial goals of reform, as indicated by the de-emphasis on the 
downsizing of government and by a high emphasis on quality of service.  
Lim and Hwang (2002) argue that the public sector reforms undertaken by 
the Kim and Roh administrations lacked consistent coordination, evaluation, 
and monitoring of the reform process.  
None of the above commentators has assessed Korea’s public sector 
reforms based on the principle of good public governance and in particular 
based on the five evaluation criteria chosen by this paper.  In view of the 
effectiveness criterion, the weakest link in the public sector reforms 
undertaken by the Kim and Roh administrations was the lack of consistency 
and coordination over time.  President Kim lost the capacity to pursue 
consistent reforms as he lost public support and credibility due to corruption 
cases involving his associates.  A variety of drastic reforms introduced by the 
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Kim government lacked consistency over the first and third structural 
changes.  The Office of Budget and the Planning and Budget Committee 
played a key role in the reforms and their coordination.  However, they were 
weakened in their ability to push the reforms forward and to continue the 
policy coordination role when they were merged into the Ministry of 
Planning and Budget (MPB) in the second restructuring.  The Kim 
government attempted to strengthen the responsibility for policy coordination 
by upgrading the role as part of the Prime Minister’s office.  However, the 
Prime Minister is appointed by the President and carries out Presidential 
directives with no autonomous or real power.  
The Roh government constantly introduced reforms based on a strong 
ideology.  The aggressive pursuit of controversial multiple reforms 
undermined his government’s coherence and consistency in the process of 
reforms, thereby losing public support and credibility, as attested by the 
crushing defeat of the government party in the 2007 presidential election. 
Added to this were uncooperative rent-seeking interest groups, which 
President Roh had promoted and supported, employing non-democratic 
tactics for their claims (Lee, 2004).  When public opinion on his reform 
agendas was polarised into conservative and progressive positions, and the 
conflicts between the two blocs escalated, President Roh revealed his lack of 
democratic leadership and inability to compromise (Yoon, 2004; Kang, 
2007).
3)
  All these developments together with the impeachment resolution 
against him exacerbated political instability, thereby hampering managerial 
improvement.  
President Roh pledged to strengthen the role of the Prime Minister during 
                                                 
3) The Hankyoreh (2004), a daily newspaper well-known for its inclination toward the 
progressive political doctrines, argued that instead of engaging in constructive discussion on 
problematic issues, President Roh served as a source of unnecessary controversy due to his 
series of missteps.  When the National Election Commission found that his behavior was in 
violation of the law, President Roh made the matter worse by offering feeble excuses rather 
than offering an acceptable apology to the opposition parties and general public.  This led to 
an impeachment resolution against his presidency by the National Assembly.  It appears that 
his political leadership and compromising ability did not score a discernible improvement 
even after the 2004 Impeachment incidence, as evidenced by his party’s dissolution after its 
crushing defeat at the 2007 presidential election.  
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his election campaign, but did not delegate any real power to the Prime 
Minister. In practice, prime ministers changed a number of times during the 
two administrations, indicating the lack of a policy coordination and 
evaluation role in the position of Prime Minister.  Given a single five-year 
term, the Presidential Office cannot perform the role of consistent 
coordination, evaluation and monitoring of reforms beyond a period of few 
years. 
Attempts to change the culture of the bureaucracy toward a more 
customer-oriented public service are not highly regarded.  P. S. Kim (2000) 
points out that those civil servants who had enjoyed privileges in the past 
were known to oppose the directions of the Civil Service Commission.  Lee 
and Park (2009) argue that the central government bureaucracy was one of 
the most powerful allies of previous conservative and authoritarian 
governments, and bureaucrats were often resistant to changes made under the 
progressive governments of Presidents Kim and Roh.  K. B. Kim (2007) 
argues that the two governments did not seriously pursue the new system of 
hiring talent and expertise from both the private and public sectors through 
competition.  In addition, there appears no evidence that showed a 
discernable improvement in the independence of civil servants from 
politicians during the two governments.  Civil servants also suffered from 
reform fatigue due to constant pressure to undertake changes by the Kim and 
Roh administrations.  With strongly imbedded bureaucratic culture with no 
significant change in human resource management of the public sector as 
well as the lack of consistent pursuit of well-coordinated reforms over time, 
the effectiveness in public governance under the Kim and Roh governments 
would not be highly regarded, as a number of Korean scholars have pointed 
out as above.  
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that all the reform efforts made by the Kim and 
Roh governments were in vain.  In particular, for the first few years of the 
Kim government, requirements for consistent pursuit of public sector reforms 
were largely met when the nation was gripped by the shock of the 1997 
financial crisis and the whole society was united under the banner of 
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recovery from the crisis.  As mentioned above, effectiveness in public 
governance would have improved through the successful introduction of e-
government during the Roh administration.  Unfortunately, however, there is 
no clear quantitative evidence, one way or the other, on the effectiveness of 
governance under the two governments other than the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGIs) estimated by Kaufman et al. (2012).
4)
  Table 
3 shows Korea’s scores of the six dimensions of public governance measured 
by Kaufmann et al. (2012).  The score of government effectiveness in Korea 
gradually increased from 0.63 in 1996, one year before the crisis, to 1.25 in 
2007, the last year of the Roh government.
5)
  Insofar as consistency in 
governance is reflected in political stability, the lack of consistency and 
coordination in the public sector reforms, as pointed out above, is shown in 
the poor score of Korea’s political stability of the WGIs, which declined 
below the 1996 level during the two administrations (table 3).  The score for 
regulatory quality increased from 0.48 in 1996 to 0.91 in 2007, although 
fluctuated somewhat over time.  Increases in Korea’s scores of government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality of the WGIs show that reform efforts by 
the two governments have not all gone in vain.   
Efficiency: the Kim government introduced a variety of measures to 
improve the efficiency in public governance.  As shown in table 1, the 
number of civil servants gradually decreased from 934,000 in 1997 to 
868,000 in 2001, although the number increased to 890,000 in 2002, the last 
year of the Kim government.  In this regard, K. B. Kim (2007) argues that 
decreases in the civil servants during the Kim government were undertaken 
without accompanying streamlining of the administrative apparatus or 
increases in productivity, and has simply resulted in the hiring of part time 
workers.  He further agues that measures to enhance the performance 
                                                 
4) It should be noted that the Worldwide Governance Indicators as shown in table 3 measure 
the perceptions of the quality of overall governance, including not only public 
administration as examined above, but also other areas such as regulation, taxation, 
management of state-owned enterprises and politics. 
5) The scores of five dimensions, except for the score of control of corruption, dipped in 1998, 
the first difficult year after being afflicted by the crisis, reflecting the prevailing perceptions 
that the crisis occurred due to the dysfunctioning government. 
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efficiency of civil servants, such as the introduction of competition in the 
public sector by hiring outside talents and experts, fell short of achieving 
their intended targets because of the lack of a coordinated and determined 
push for them.  Lim and Hwang (2002) point out those overlapping functions 
among government agencies were not coordinated, and that the government 
organisation was still full of redundancy, corruption, red tape and a peace-at-
any-price principle.  They also argue that the human resource management 
system in the public sector has remained unchanged without undertaking new 
initiatives that both of the governments envisioned.  
Although these negative comments would be valid from certain 
perspectives, it appears that the efficiency in public governance improved 
significantly particularly under the Kim government, as it is measured in 
terms of the number of civil servants.  As mentioned earlier, efficiency is a 
matter of output to input ratio.  However, since output measurements of the 
public sector or its productivity are not readily available, efficiency is 
assessed by the number of civil servants, a main source of public input.  The 
number of civil servant decreased substantially in terms of not only the 
absolute number but also the ratios to population and to total employed 
workers.  As shown in table 1, the number of civil servants decreased by 
5.0% in 1998 and further decreased annually, though slightly, until 2002, the 
last year of the Kim government.  This is a remarkable contrast to the annual 
increment until the outbreak of the 1997 crisis.  As a percentage of 
population, the number of civil servants decreased from 2.00% in 1997 to 
1.85% in 2002.  Soon after the crisis, there was criticism that the public 
sector did not take a fair share of pain from the crisis.  In response to this, 
public sector employment gradually decreased as a percentage of overall 
employment from 4.46% in 1998 to 4.01% in 2002 (table 1).  
It appears that the Roh government de-emphasised efficiency in 
implementing multiple reforms, thereby lowering the efficiency, measured by 
the number of civil servants and their salary.  The number of civil servants 
increased substantially from 890,000 in 2002 to 975,000 in 2007, or a 1.84% 
annual growth (table 1).  As a percentage of the total population, the number 
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Table 2 Expenditure on Civil Service Salaries (Personnel Expenses),  
2001-2009 
 
Total 
Salary  
(trill. won) 
Salary 
Exp./GDP (%) 
Salary 
Exp./Total 
Govt. Exp. (%) 
Salary/Civil 
Servant/Year 
(‘000won)* 
2001 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
2002 10.7 1.6 9.8 12,022 
2003 11.4 1.6 9.7 12,445 
2004 16.2 2.1 13.7 17,309 
2005 17.2 2.1 12.8 18,475 
2006 18.2 2.1 12.6 19,018 
2007 19.2 2.1 12.5 19,727 
2008 20.4 2.0 11.6 20,902 
2009 20.9 2.0 10.4 20,484 
Note: * total salary in column 1 divided by the number of civil servants in table 1.   
Sources: KNSO (2003-2010a). 
 
of civil servants increased gradually during the Roh government, reaching 
the 1997 level of 2.01% in 2007, the last year of his government.  Also, the 
ratio of civil servants to overall employment increased from 4.01% in 2002 
to 4.14% in 2003 and remained at a more or less unchanged level over the 
Roh government.  During the Roh administration, salary for civil servants 
also increased remarkably.  Table 2 shows that the ratio of civil servants’ 
salary to GDP jumped from 1.6% in 2003 to 2.1% over the 2004-2007 period.  
As a proportion of total government expenditure, salary to civil servants 
increased from 9.8% in 2002 to an average of 12.3% over the five-year 
period of his government.  Salary per civil servant increased at an annual rate 
of 10.6% over the 2002-2007 period, while the wage level of all non-
agricultural industries increased by only 6.3% (KNSO, 2010a).  
Predictability: it is doubtful that predictability in public governance has 
improved significantly, because of the lack of consistency and coordination 
in the series of reforms undertaken, as discussed above.  Continuous 
introduction of controversial reforms based on strong ideology by the Roh 
government did not help improve predictability.  This may be reflected in the 
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volatility of budgetary expenditure and of the number of civil servants.  As 
shown in table 1, the annual growth rates of public expenditure ranged from 
–0.5% to 20.8% over the Kim and Roh governments.  As a percentage of 
GDP, public expenditure ranged 19.9% to 26.0% over the two governments. 
The lack of predictability is shown in the score of political stability and 
absence of violence of the WGIs (table 3).  The score was 0.52 in 1996, and 
remained below that level throughout the two governments. 
Transparency: as examined above, both the Kim and Roh governments 
made significant efforts to enhance transparency in public administration.  In 
spite of all these efforts, the level of transparency in Korea, as measured by 
corruption levels, remained remarkably low.  According to KNSO (2010b, p. 
520), the number of reported crimes per one million people remained at 
about 200 during the 1980s and increased to 300 in the 1990s.  The number 
then increased to about 400 during the Kim and Roh governments.  The 
annual number of government official crimes, which is related to corruption, 
fluctuates widely over time.  It remained at around 500 during the 1980s and 
increased to 1800 in the 1990s before the Kim government.  The number then 
increased to 2800 during the Kim and Roh governments.
6)
  An empirical 
study by Choi (2009) shows that the abovementioned KICAC has not been 
effective in fighting corruption due to a lack of adequate institutionalisation. 
Its detection rate for corrupt practices is relatively high, but its prosecution 
rate is low.  This is in part due to a lack of resources, particularly to the 
prosecutors’ offices.  KICAC’s educational role in the society and business 
community is also regarded as weak and inadequate.
7)
  The lack of 
transparency in Korea’s public governance is also shown by the score of 
control of corruption of the WGIs.  As shown in table 3, the score for 
corruption control fluctuated widely over the two governments, showing no 
                                                 
6) Tsai (2009) argues that a high degree of political corruption remains as a characteristic 
feature of Korean governance even after its consolidated democratisation. 
7) Choi (2009) argues that the recent merging of KICAC with other bodies under the Lee 
Myung-bak government will only exacerbate this problem because of weak functional 
relevancy and coherence among the three merged agencies, thereby diluting KICAC’s core 
function of combating corruption. 
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significant improvement.
8)
  Although the score for the rule of law improved 
somewhat, transparency is obviously the weakest part of Korea’s public 
governance over the two governments. 
Participation: Both the Kim and Roh governments attempted to promote 
public participation in policy-making as well as public administration by 
establishing special committees and commissions and advancing e-
government.  In particular, the Roh government, designated as a 
“Participatory Government,” attempted to foster civil society organisations 
and established numerous committees and commissions, although mainly for 
policy-making areas.  However, many of these civil society organisations 
turned out to be uncooperative rent-seeking interest groups, thereby failing to 
facilitate public participation (C. H. Lee, 2004).  This poor quality of 
citizens’ participation in politics is also reflected in a low score of voice and 
accountability of the WGIs.  As shown in table 3, the score of voice and 
accountability in Korea started with 0.62 in 1996 and remained more or less 
unchanged over the Kim and Roh governments.  It looks quite likely though 
that public participation in government administrative procedures improved 
considerably through e-government.  This is reflected in the improvements in 
Korea’s ranks in e-participation index of the UN Global E-Government 
Survey from 5th in 2005 to 2nd in 2008 and further to 1st in 2010 (UN, 
2010).   
 
 
5. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENT 
MANAGERIAL REFORMS 
 
So far the reforms in Korea’s public sector have been analysed and 
assessed in terms of their effects on the five dimensions of good public governance. 
                                                 
8) It should be noted that the score of corruption in table 3 is a perception-based and subjective 
measure obtained from opinion survey results.  Hence, the score cannot be related 
empirically to the causes of corruption.  Lately, Kim and Lee (2011) have developed an 
alternative measure based on objective evidence which helps relate empirically corruption 
results to their causes. 
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Table 3 Governance Indicators: Korea and OECD 
 1996 1998 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
VA         
Estimate 062 0.54 0.55 0.71 0.62 0.65 0.61 0.68 
Percentile Rank  66 65 65 71 68 68 68 68 
OECD Estimate 1.28 1.38 1.39 1.41 1.32 1.30 1.29 1.24 
OECD Rank 89.9 91.4 91.5 91.6 91.3 91.2 90.6 88.5 
PV         
Estimate  0.52 0.42 0.30 0.45 0.25 0.41 0.29 0.19 
Percentile Rank  63 60 58 62 54 60 55 51 
OECD: Estimate 1.06 1.11 1.17 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.77 
OECD: Rank 85.7 87.4 88.3 80.2 80.6 82.1 81.9 74.5 
GE         
Estimate  0.63 0.33 0.70 1.02 1.08 1.25 1.09 1.08 
Percentile Rank  73 64 76 82 82 86 83 82 
OECD: Estimate 1.84 1.69 1.72 1.52 1.55 1.52 1.49 1.37 
OECD: Rank 92.5 92.2 92.0 88.4 88.7 88.6 88.7 88.2 
RQ         
Estimate  0.48 0.31 0.59 0.82 0.73 0.91 0.71 0.82 
Percentile Rank  66 62 70 73 73 79 73 75 
OECD: Estimate 1.04 1.36 1.42 1.44 1.46 1.48 1.47 1.31 
OECD: Rank 86.7 90.3 90.8 91.5 91.1 91.1 91.2 87.7 
RL         
Estimate  0.75 0.73 0.83 0.97 0.83 1.01 0.84 0.98 
Percentile Rank  69 73 74 81 73 83 76 82 
OECD: Estimate 1.62 1.59 1.56 1.45 1.49 1.51 1.50 1.36 
OECD: Rank 92.6 92.0 92.3 89.1 90.1 90.2 90.2 86.7 
CC         
Estimate  0.27 0.34 0.25 0.60 0.28 0.52 0.37 0.52 
Percentile Rank  65 65 65 71 65 73 68 71 
OECD: Estimate 1.76 1.72 1.71 1.62 1.65 1.69 1.64 1.37 
OECD:  Rank 91.6 91.7 92.0 90.3 90.4 90.3 90.2 85.3 
Note: * VA: voice and accountability; PV: political stability and absence of violence; GE: 
government effectiveness; RQ: regulatory quality; RL: rule of law; and CC: control of 
corruption. 
Sources: Kaufmann et al. (2008, 2012).  
 
This assessment is augmented by comparing the quality of various facets of 
public governance in Korea with those of OECD and other countries.  This is 
done based on the WGIs estimated by Kaufmann et al. (2012) and other 
global organisations.  Table 3 also shows Korea’s percentile ranks of the six 
dimensions of public governance out of 212 countries and territories 
surveyed by Kaufmann et al.  
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Effectiveness: as shown in the trend of GE (government effectiveness) in 
table 3, effectiveness of Korea’s public governance is still far behind the 
OECD average.  Korea’s government effectiveness score by the WGIs has 
improved more or less steadily over the period 1998-2007 with an average 
score of 0.88.   This is compared to an OECD average of 1.60 which is 
almost twice as large as the Korean average score.  Korea’s percentile rank 
for the government effectiveness was 78th over the period 1998-2007, 
indicating that 78% of the countries surveyed were less effective than Korea 
or 22% of the countries (or about 46 countries) were better than Korea.  This 
is compared to an OECD average of 90.0th.
9)
  Another WGI that reflects 
effectiveness of public governance is regulatory quality.  As pointed out 
earlier, the score of regulatory quality improved substantially over the two 
governments with an average score of 0.67, which is yet far below an OECD 
average of 1.43.  Korea’s average percentile rank was 71.4th compared to an 
OECD average of 91.0th. 
Another comparative assessment of the effectiveness of public governance 
is made by means of the indicators measured by the International Institute for 
Management Development (IMD).  One of the indicators is “government 
decisions” that indicate the extent of government decisions being effectively 
implemented.  Table 4 shows Korea’s rank for “government decisions,” 
ranging from 30th to 42nd out of 47 to 55 countries over the period 2000-
2007.  Korea’s rank for “public service,” which indicates the extent of the 
independence of civil servants from political interference, ranged 20th to 
42nd, with an average of 28th, over the 2000-2007 period.  For 
“bureaucracy” which shows the extent of bureaucrats’ hindrance of business 
activity, Korea’s ranks ranged from 22nd to 35th over the period 2000-2007.  
These results appear to support the results of the comparative assessment of 
effectiveness of public governance by the WGIs (table 3). 
Predictability: “political stability and the absence of violence” would have 
                                                 
9) Over the period 2008-2009, the earlier part of the Lee Myung-bak government, Korea’s 
government effectiveness did not improve significantly by the World Bank Governance 
Indicators.   
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Table 4 Korea’s Rank in the Area of Government Efficiency (IMD) 
 2000 2001 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Gov. 
Decisions
*
 
39 35 30 40 33 42 34 30 39 15 
Public 
Service 
42 26 24 32 20 25 29 26 n.a n.a 
Bureaucracy 35 24 25 26 22 22 24 42 39 32 
Transparency 41 36 36 41 34 38 34 35 37 27 
Bribing & 
Corruption 
34 28 30 42 33 22 29 30 29 29 
CPI
**
 48 42 40 47 40 42 43 40 39 39 
Notes: * “Government decisions” are effectively implemented.  “Public service” is not 
independent from political interference. “Bureaucracy” does not hinder business 
activity.  “Transparency” of government policy is satisfactory.  “Bribing and 
corruption” do not exist.  ** Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International.  
Sources: International Institute for Management Development (IMD) (2000-2010), 
Transparency International (TI) (2010). 
 
helped to enhance the predictability and consistency of public management.  
As shown in table 3, the score of political stability and absence of violence of 
the WGIs deteriorated over the Kim and Roh governments with an average of 
0.37.  This is compared to an OECD average score of 1.04, three times as 
high as the Korean average.  Over the same period, Korea’s percentile rank 
also declined with an average of 58.8th, compared to an OECD average rank 
of 83.7th.  All this shows that Korea’s predictability of public governance 
lagged far behind an OECD average throughout the period 1998-2007.  
Transparency: Insofar as maintenance of the rule of law reflects part of the 
transparency in public governance, Korea’s performance is quite poor 
relative to OECD countries.  Table 3 shows that Korea’s score for the rule of 
law improved over the Kim and Roh governments with an average value of 
0.87, while the OECD average was 1.52.  Over the two governments, 
Korea’s percentile rank for the rule of law was on average 76.8th in 
comparison with an OECD average of 90.7th.  As the transparency 
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dimension of public governance is measured by the control of corruption, 
Korea fares quite poorly as compared to OECD countries.  Korea’s average 
score for the control of corruption over the 1998-2007 period was 0.39, and 
this was compared to an OECD average of 1.68.  In terms of percentile ranks 
on the control of corruption, Korea also fell far behind OECD countries in 
that Korea’s rank was 67.8th in comparison with an OECD average of 90.9th.  
The International Institute for Management Development (IMD) also 
develops international indexes of “transparency” and “bribing and 
corruption”.  For both of these indexes, Korea ranked poorly, although 
improved somewhat over time.  Korea’s rank for “transparency” was on 
overage 37.1st over the period 2000-2007 and for “bribing and corruption” it 
was 31.1st (table 4).  Korea also ranks quite poorly on the Corruption 
Perceptions Index by Transparency International, although slightly improved 
over time.  As shown in table 4, Korea’s rank ranged from 40th to 48th on 
the Corruption Perception Index between 2000 and 2007, with an average of 
43.1st.  All this indicates that although both the Kim and Roh governments 
made significant efforts to enhance transparency in public administration, the 
level of transparency in Korean government management remained 
remarkably lower than those of OECD countries.
10)
     
Participation: the Kim and Roh governments made serious efforts to 
enhance public participation in government affairs.  Participation in public 
management as indicated by “voice and accountability” of the WGIs shows 
that Korea remained more or less unchanged over the Kim and Roh 
governments and far below other OECD countries (table 3).  Over the period 
1998-2007, Korea’s average score was 61.0, far below the corresponding 
OECD average of 1.36.  In terms of percentile ranks, Korea’s average rank of 
67.4th was well below the OECD average of 91.4th.  
 
 
                                                 
10) It should be noted that the level of corruption and the rule of law are determined not only by 
public governance but also by poor corporate governance of private business, both of which 
need to improve to lower the corruption level. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has examined reforms of public sector management in Korea 
since 1997 and assessed them on the basis of five criteria of public 
governance and in comparison to other countries over the Kim and Roh 
governments.  Both governments undertook a variety of reforms in public 
management with the objective of rationalising state functions to create a 
smaller, more efficient government and to provide more customer-oriented 
public services.  To this end, the Kim government downsized the public 
sector and introduced a new budgeting system.  Both governments 
introduced structural reorganisations, merit-based human resource 
management, and a new information system.  They both developed schemes 
for public participation and implemented anti-corruption policy.  
The success of the reforms undertaken by the Kim and Roh 
administrations may be regarded as mixed.  They have succeeded in 
improving certain aspects of public governance with some evidence, and yet 
there remains room for improvement in overall public governance.  
Effectiveness in public governance has improved, and yet Korea’s value in 
this domain remains far below the corresponding OECD average.  Public 
governance efficiency has also improved particularly during the Kim 
government, while no convincing evidence has been found in efficiency 
improvement under the Roh government.  Predictability and consistency 
have been low, particularly compared to advanced countries, mainly because 
of the continuous introduction of multiple reform programs with poor 
coordination.  Serious efforts have been made to improve citizens’ 
participation in public administration with some evidence of improvement 
particularly through implementation of e-government.  Nonetheless Korea 
has fared poorly as compared to OECD countries with regard to public 
participation in government administration.  It appears that transparency in 
public governance has performed most poorly over the two governments.  
A few important success factors for public sector reforms emerge from this 
critical analysis and assessment of Korea’s reforms in public administration.  
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They include a strong and consistent commitment of the President, 
participation of citizens and key stakeholders, and public support for 
government reform measures.  Given a single five-year term, the Presidential 
Office cannot perform the role of consistent coordination, evaluation and 
monitoring of reforms beyond a period of few years.  Hence, an organisation 
under direct presidential authority, with a legal foundation of substantial 
independence and autonomy, will be needed to pursue public sector reforms 
in a consistent and coherent way.  
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